So, I just finished reading A History of Modern Russia as a result of a long time being stuck on the tarmac. For the most part, I found the book useful, but uninteresting, as it is mainly an overview of the history USSR from an extremely leader-centric point of view, as opposed to a more interesting (at least in my mind), systematic, pericentric point of view. However, it did bring up an interesting point, namely, the question of whether or not Stalin can be credited with preparing the country economically for Operation Barbarossa. It claims (with some evidence), that if the NEP policies of limited market economy were continued, the final economic outcome would have been similar to the effect of Stalin's Purge/Boom. Moreover, it claimed (with less evidence), but with similar persuasiveness, that the brutality of Stalin's regime did nothing to ensure social commitment to the war effort, and may have been counterproductive.
It brings into sharp relief a question that has been percolating in the old brainpan for quite some time- namely, what amount of supposedly "vital" policy is merely the result of the requirements of personal aesthetics, rather than reality. This question is also prompted by Seeing Like a State, which argues, very convincingly, I might add, that the reason for a lot of modern political experiments is to make things easy for centralized organizations to see and manipulate, rather than because they are required, historically necessary, or "better."
There's not much more to this than a question- how many things that are "required" are actually just the result of preference? I don't know the answer, but it's a good question, isn't it?
It brings into sharp relief a question that has been percolating in the old brainpan for quite some time- namely, what amount of supposedly "vital" policy is merely the result of the requirements of personal aesthetics, rather than reality. This question is also prompted by Seeing Like a State, which argues, very convincingly, I might add, that the reason for a lot of modern political experiments is to make things easy for centralized organizations to see and manipulate, rather than because they are required, historically necessary, or "better."
There's not much more to this than a question- how many things that are "required" are actually just the result of preference? I don't know the answer, but it's a good question, isn't it?
